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PATENT REVERSION: 
AN EMPLOYEE-INVENTOR’S SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE 
 
Richard A. Kamprath* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America has a large, technology-driven economy and its 
continued success can be partially attributed to the strong patent system controlled by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).1  For the past thirty-five years, 
though, the United States has slowly been losing its grip as the world’s leader in 
technology and innovation.2  American investment in science and engineering education, 
research, and development has not kept pace with the rest of the world and this will 
eventually erode our technological advantage.3  Whether this is caused by lack of interest 
in technical fields of study, increased global competition, or a combination of multiple 
                                                
* Juris Doctor 2011, SMU Dedman School of Law in Dallas, Texas; Master of Science in Electrical 
Engineering 2007, Texas A&M University; Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering 2004, Texas 
A&M University. A special thanks to Bart Showalter, Adam Todd, and Nicole Kamprath for their edits and 
suggestions.  
1 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 298 (Carsten Fink and Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) 
(“There is a strong positive relationship between patent strength and real per capita gross national product 
(GNP): Patent= -0.51 +0.49xGNP.”).  
2 THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: IS THE 
UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE? 1 (2005). The Task Force, comprised of technology 
companies and organizations, devised a list of benchmarks to help define how the United States is 
performing against other nations in technology innovation. The benchmarks are in education, science and 
engineering workforce, scientific knowledge creation, R&D investments, high-tech investment, and 
specific high-tech sector economic output. According to all of the benchmarks, the United States is losing 
ground to the European Union and Asia. The Task Force concluded, “our advantage is eroding rapidly as 
other countries commit significant resources to enhance their own innovative capabilities.” Accord 
TAPPING AMERICA’S POTENTIAL: THE EDUCATION INNOVATION INITIATIVE, GAINING MOMENTUM, LOSING 
GROUND 6-7 (2008). Tapping America’s Potential is another group of technology companies and 
organizations with the goal of increased U.S. investment in science and engineering education. See also 
Henrik D. Parker, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 603 n.1 (1984) 
(quoting Federal Incentives for Innovation: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. On Science, 
Technology, and Commerce of the Senate Comm. On Commerce, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1973) (remarks 
of R. Kuntz, Pres. & Nat’l Dir., Cal. Soc’y Prof. Eng’rs). Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. Of Justice of the Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1984) (remarks by Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of the 
Subcomm.) (“Between 1972 and 1980, the number of patents to American citizens declined dramatically 
from 225 per million persons to 169 per million. The percentage of U.S. patents issued to foreign 
persons…increased from 25 percent of the total to nearly 40 percent of the total….These statistics raise a 
profound question about why we appear to be losing our edge in the intellectual property marketplace.”).  
3 TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 1. See also Peter Caldwell, 
Employment Agreements for the Inventing Worker: A Proposal For Reforming Trailer Clause 
Enforceability Guidelines, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 293 (2006). The ratio of American citizen-filed U.S. 
patent applications to foreign-filed U.S. patent applications has steadily decreased over the past four 




factors, the effect remains the same: each year relatively fewer and fewer American 
inventions are being created and patented.4  The social cost created by an increased 
dependence on foreign technological know-how and products is the eventual erosion of 
America’s dominant economic position.   
This underproduction of innovation can be partially attributed to the fact that 
American companies employing scientists and engineers overwhelmingly require their 
employees to pre-assign all inventions to their employer.5  Because of their asymmetrical 
bargaining power, the technology companies can usually demand all prospective 
employees sign such an assignment of patent rights.6  In many circumstances, these 
assignments could even be considered adhesion contracts because they leave no 
alternative for a prospective employee.7  This creates a large disincentive for technical 
employees to innovate and participate in the patenting process because the personal 
benefit they would have enjoyed from a patent has been taken away. 8   Because 
employee-inventors are methodically undercompensated, it should come as no surprise 
that the brightest American students would rather be doctors and attorneys than scientists 
or engineers.9 
The employer’s role in the marketplace, however, cannot be overlooked in the 
rush to advocate for the employee-inventor.  In bringing products to market, especially in 
high technology fields, all of the costs and risk of failure appear to fall on the shoulders 
                                                
4 See Parker, supra note 2, at 603. 
5 See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 
(1999); Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
the Admin. Of Justice of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1984) (remarks by Rep. Robert 
W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcomm.). With the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
the statutory impetus for individuals to navigate the patent process on their own erodes even further. See 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 341 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 35 U.S.C.). The AIA implements a ‘first to file’ system, which grants patent protection to the 
first person to file an application covering an innovation. Id. at § 3. This system favors those entities that 
can dedicate fiscal resources and personnel solely to creating patent applications as fast as possible. 
Competing against large corporations and universities, America may very well see the death of the 
individual inventor.  
6 Parker, supra note 2, at 608. Some states have imposed limitations on employer’s power to contract away 
employee invention rights through pre-assignments. See Merges, supra note 5, at 9 n.30. Other countries go 
even further. “Japan severely restricts the use of pre-invention assignment agreements, as discussed infra. 
The agreements may only include inventions that result from an employee’s duties and that relate to the 
employers’ businesses.” Parker, supra note 2, at 608 n.35 (quoting Parsons, U.S. Lags in Patent Reform, 15 
IEEE Spectrum, March 1978 at 60, 64). The German Employee Inventions Act of 1957, as discussed infra, 
requires, “the employer separately compensate each employee who invents in the course of 
employment….The general approach is to pay each employee-inventor as if he held ownership rights and 
had entered into an arm’s length licensing agreement with the employer.” Merges, supra note 5, at 42-43.  
7 Parker, supra note 2, at 625; See Jay Dratler Jr., Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose of the 
Patent System, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 129, 144 (1979). This is especially true for engineers and scientists 
that work at large research and development companies or universities.  
8 Accord Parker, supra note 2, at 625. It could be argued that inventive employees have the option of 
starting their own company based on their innovation, but as will be discussed infra, this is an illusory 
dream because of the common law assignment of inventions or pre-assignment contracts required of most 
technological employees. Cf. Merges, supra note 5, at 45.  
9 Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World Unite! A Call for Collective Action by Employee-Inventors, 37 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 683 (1997).  
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of the employer.10  Pharmaceuticals are an excellent example of how expensive and 
financially risky research and development in cutting edge technology can be.  The cost 
to bring one new drug to market is around $800 million when the costs of research and 
failures are taken into account.11  “[F]ewer than one in five drug candidates that make it 
out of the laboratory survive this process and reach the marketplace in the form of FDA-
approved pharmaceuticals.”12  Patent protection, through the grant of an exclusive 
monopoly, allows an innovator the opportunity to recover the costs of research, 
development, and testing.13  To recoup these expenses and hopefully make a profit, 
companies necessarily rely on assignment of the patents underlying their products.  
Furthermore, one could argue that the employer provides adequate compensation to the 
employee-inventor in the form of increased wages, bonuses, and stock options 
proportional to the probability of a successful invention by the employee.14  In practice, 
however, the market continues to leave the employee-inventor undercompensated for his 
inventive contributions because of the unequal bargaining position held by his 
employer.15   
In an attempt to more fully compensate employee-inventors without harming the 
return on investment of employers, this article proposes a joint ownership patent 
reversion modeled after that already in place in copyright law.16  In Section I, the 
background of the relationship between employer and employee-inventor is discussed in 
terms of patent rights.  This section outlines the problems inherent in the pre-assignment 
status quo of these rights from employees to employers.  Section II begins with Part A, 
which is a review of previously proposed solutions to the undercompensation of 
employee-inventors and why they have not been sufficient.  The second part of Section II 
begins with a discussion of the proposed patent reversion and why it should be 
implemented.  Part B(i) discusses the reversion found in copyright which terminates 
                                                
10 Cf. Yuval Feldman, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Social Norms: The Allocation of 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Workplace, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59, 68 (2002) (“[E]ven in the context 
of fairness, some argue that, given that employers internalize the risks of employing many engineers that 
invent nothing, it is fair that they should at least get rewarded for their better choices.”).  
11 See e.g. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 2 151 (2003); In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d 943, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J. dissenting), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (U.S. Jun 01, 2009) 
(NO. 08-964), aff’d but criticized, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (U.S. Jun 28, 2010) (NO. 08-964).  
12 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1006 (Mayer, J. dissenting) (citing Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets 
the U.S. Patent System, 38 Akron L. Rev. 299, 313-314 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  
13 Id.  
14 See Feldman, supra note 10, at 68 n.33; Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
the Admin. Of Justice of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1984) (remarks by Donald W. 
Banner, IPO, Inc.) (“[S]alaries of creative employees are adjusted in proportion to the value of their 
contributions.”).  
15 See Bartow, supra note 9, at 683 (“[F]oreign scientists and engineers…gladly accepted meager wages in 
exchange for the opportunity to live in the United States for a few years, enhance their resumes, and 
perhaps make professional connections that would lead to more lucrative employment later, either in this 
country or abroad. The willingness of…noncitizens to be exploited in this manner undoubtedly serves to 
depress wages for all technical professionals, and to limit the employment opportunities available for 
American citizens or others with long term commitments to the U.S.”).  
16 1976 Copyright Act (Title 17) (Oct. 19, 1976, Pub.L. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 to 2598). Discussed 




transfers and licenses granted by the author based on a statutorily defined process and 
time period.  Part B(ii) of Section II proposes applying a reversion of patent rights to the 
inventor during the last part of the patent’s exclusivity period.  Part (1) defines the patent 
reversion and its framework.  Part (2) lays out the benefits of the reversion to employers.  
Part (3) discusses both the theoretical and practical considerations associated with a 
patent reversion along with how the reversion can be implemented to create solutions.  In 
Section III, the conclusion gives a brief outline of what was discussed and proposes that a 
patent reversion should be implemented in the future.   
I. THE PLIGHT OF THE EMPLOYEE-INVENTOR AND THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE 
LAW 
In exchange for making their knowledge public and encouraging technological 
innovation, an inventor is given a statutorily protected monopoly to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling a patented invention.17  With the rise of specialization in the 
workplace, large corporations dominate research and development.  In many advanced 
technological fields, such as integrated circuits, pharmaceuticals, and the defense 
industry, these corporations also file the overwhelming majority of patent applications 
each year.18   
Employee-inventors have not been able to represent themselves in the political or 
legislative process because of their diversity.  In addition to working for a myriad of 
technology companies with domestic and international principle places of business, 
employee-inventors have diverse citizenship, resident status, cultural, and ethnic 
backgrounds that make coordinated political involvement practically impossible.  The 
dissimilar backgrounds and interests of the science and engineering population prevent 
the cohesion required to form a political voice capable of being heard.19   
In response, the common law evolved to define the ownership of patents created 
in the workplace.  Initially, the common law divided the ownership rights of patents 
developed by employee-inventors based on three factors: “(1) the nature of employment, 
(2) the relation [of the invention] to the normal scope of the employer’s business, and (3) 
the extent to which the resources of the employer were used in the conception and 
development of the invention.”20  Using these factors, the common law gave inventors 
                                                
17 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).  
18 Jean E. Healy, The Application of Japanese Article 35 Regarding ‘Reasonable Compensation for Patents 
by Employed Inventors in Syuji Nakamura v. Nichia Corporation, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 387, 388 (2005). 
(“In Japan, ‘the ratio of patent applications by corporations and government offices to the total of patent 
applications is approximately 97%.’”).  
19 In this sense, employee-inventors may fall into the category of “discrete and insular minorities. . .which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities.” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  
20 Parker, supra note 2, at 607-08. The first factor, the nature of employment, was further broken down into 
separate categories. In common law, if an employee-inventor was hired to invent, the employer owned the 
invention. Inventions outside the scope of employment but made using the employer’s assets granted a 
shop right, or a non-transferable license, to the employer. Inventions made outside the scope of 
employment without the use of the employer’s assets were owned solely by the employee. The second 
factor is the relation of the invention to the normal scope of the employer’s business. The employer’s 
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employed in research and development no ownership of their invention in the majority of 
circumstances.21  Partially in response to ambiguities in the common law, and partially 
because no force opposed a race to the bottom, employers began requiring employees to 
pre-assign their rights to any inventions as a pre-requisite to their employment.22  Today, 
the consequences of the race can be seen in the limited bargaining power of employee-
inventors and the almost universal use of pre-assignment of inventive rights.   
The patent laws of the United States were created based on the underlying 
assumption that an inventor would share his knowledge and apply for a patent because of 
the incentive of a monopoly gained from the exchange.23  “Our society has long 
recognized the intensely personal nature of an invention and the importance of providing 
stimulation and encouragement to inventors.”24  By requiring pre-assignment of patent 
rights, employers arguably ‘usurp the inventive bounty’ intended for inventors 
themselves.25  “Assignment agreements…remove a powerful economic incentive from 
the people who do the day-to-day work of innovation.”26  For example, an employee-
inventor working for American Cyanamid reported not being compensated at all for an 
invention that was bringing the company over $50 million a year in sales.27  Another 
employee-inventor working for Lockheed Corporation was ultimately compensated a 
total of $21,250 for an invention worth $50 million.28  Similarly, in Japan, an employee-
inventor who created the high intensity blue LED was compensated $180 by his 
employer Nichia Corporation for an invention worth an estimated $1.14 billion.29  In the 
aggregate, many employers around the world could conceivably be undercompensating 
                                                                                                                                            
interest in an employee’s invention increases the closer the invention comes to the employer’s business 
practice. Finally, the third factor was the amount of the employer’s resources that were used by the 
employee to create the invention. Like the second factor, the more employer resources used by the 
employee to invent, the greater the employer’s interest in the invention. The resources include the time, 
tools, and facilities of the employer. Merges, supra note 5, at 17. 
21 As discussed in the previous note, an employee hired to invent retained no common law rights in his 
inventions. An invention by a non-R&D employee related to his job or created using the employer’s 
resources gave the employer a shop right. Only inventions unrelated to the employee-inventor’s job and 
created without use of the employer’s resources were retained by the employee. See Merges, supra note 5, 
at 5-7; Parker, supra note 2, at 606-08. 
22 Parker, supra note 2, at 608. 
23 Bartow, supra note 9, at 676. As mentioned supra, the benefits include a monopoly on the technology for 
twenty years.  
24 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 887 (N.J. 1988).  
25 Bartow, supra note 9, at 682. 
26 Dratler, supra note 7, at 147-48. 
27 Bartow, supra note 9, at 693. 
28 Id.  
29 Healy, supra note 18, at 403. The employee eventually filed suit in Japan and while a settlement for $8.1 
million was reached, the Tokyo District Court initially awarded him half of the anticipated profits, or $570 
million. While his employer seemed to disregard his role in the invention, the technological community 
took note of Mr. Nakamura: he was subsequently awarded the Millennium Technology Prize for his 
contributions to science. Millennium Technology Prize Website, 




employees for the rights to their inventions because mandatory pre-assignment contracts 
give employees little recourse.30   
The American patent system and corporate intellectual property practices do not 
sufficiently encourage employee-inventors to create new patents.31  There are three main 
justifications for doing away with the employee-inventor status quo—which are shaped 
by fairness and efficiency: (1) employers own all of the intellectual property rights 
through stronger bargaining positions, (2) employers define the amount, if any, of the 
compensation, and (3) maximizing the profits of the business do not necessarily coincide 
with the fair use of an invention.  First, almost all technical companies require their 
employees to sign pre-assignment agreements as a condition to receiving employment.32  
If a job-seeker wants to work in the technology field, he must sign such an agreement 
because there is no other option.  Therefore, job-seeking inventors are at a bargaining 
disadvantage to their prospective employers from the beginning of their relationship.33  
Mandatory pre-assignment contracts marginalize the “extraordinary amounts of time, 
education, training, intellect, energy, and waking and sleeping thought” expended by the 
employee-inventor in inventing, and this is unfair to inventors.34   
Because of this stronger bargaining position, employers can define the 
compensation paid to employee-inventors. 35   Many companies reward inventive 
employees through bonus programs or reward systems.36  These can be divided into four 
separate categories: “(1) implicit career-path progressions that reward significant 
inventions through a series of implicit promotions, (2) spot bonuses given for significant 
inventions, (3) output-based bonus schemes, and (4) more elaborate reward systems 
based on an administrative assessment of invention value.”37  While these programs seem 
to address the unfair compensation of employee-inventors, they only mask the problem.  
Employer defined reward programs are usually discretionary and frequently can be 
modified at the whim of the employer.38  In addition to the theoretical failings of these 
                                                
30 Japan and Germany have statutorily protected employee-inventors as discussed infra notes 86-90 and 
accompanying text. Other compensation measures initiated by employers are usually at the discretion of the 
employers, which could be argued as illusory. This is discussed infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. 
31 Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 887; see Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Patents: Optimizing Organizational 
Responses to Innovation Opportunities and Invention Discoveries, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 30-31 
(2006) (detailing the practices and reasons for corporate compensation for inventions) 
32  Parker, supra note 2, at 608 n.11 (citing Allen, Invention Pacts: Between the Lines, 15 IEEE 
SPECTRUM, March 1978, at 54 (detailing a survey which showed that approximately nine out of ten 
companies having over 250 employees required patent assignment agreements)); William Hubbard, 
Inventing Norms, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 369, 389 n.125 (stating that many employers require employees to 
assign patents rights); Merges, supra note 5, at 7. 
33 Id.  
34 Bartow, supra note 9, at 675. 
35 See Dratler, supra note 7, at 147-48. 
36 Merges, supra note 5, at 39-40. 
37 Id.  
38 Parker, supra note 2, at 626 (“Existing reward plans, however, are discretionary, subject to the 
employer’s changes of policy, and have not improved the declining United States patent balance or the 
inadequate patent productivity per dollar.”). There are limited examples of fair compensation for employee-
inventors through employer initiated compensation programs as discussed infra note 63 and accompanying 
text. In addition, a situation could be hypothesized wherein an employee-inventor has academic or 
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plans, they also have not stymied the declining U.S. patent balance in practice:39 current 
compensation systems do not appear to create an effective incentive to invent for an 
employee-inventor.40   
Another problem is that there may be dissonance in a company’s decision 
between making a profit and promoting an employee’s invention.  A corporation that has 
a well-entrenched market share with heavy investment in manufacturing, personnel, 
advertising, and marketing may realize, “it is more profitable to suppress innovation than 
to retool and begin advertising and marketing a new or substantially changed product, 
even when the new or changed product is technologically superior.”41  Therefore, an 
inventive corporation may have a rational economic reason to suppress innovation where 
an individual inventor would not. 42   Enforcement of assignment agreements thus 
reinforces the concentration of technological power in large-scale research and 
development entities.43   
Similarly, a pre-assignment of patent rights also takes control of patent 
prosecution out of the hands of the employee-inventor and gives it to the employer.  An 
employer’s subsequent interest, or lack thereof, in an invention may be due to its 
individual economic situation rather than the possible benefit to society.44  An employer 
may choose not to patent or exploit a proposed invention due to a lack of financial capital 
or because the idea was not part of the employer’s business model.45  “It is unfortunate 
that one company’s determination may cause a socially valuable invention to be 
                                                                                                                                            
industrial weight to more fairly bargain for his own invention compensation. Such a situation, however, 
does not address the overall lack of bargaining power of the employee-inventor group as a whole. See 
Parker, supra note 2, at 608 (“[I]nventors who demand unusual contract terms may reduce their 
opportunities to change jobs because employers are wary of inventors who try to obtain more than the 
traditional rewards for their inventions.”).  
39 Id.  
40 Cf. Merges, supra note 5, at 3. Merges argues that employee reward programs and the possibility of 
leaving an employer to begin a startup sufficiently induce employee-inventors to invent. Some reward 
systems appear to fairly compensate the employee-inventor, such as BMC’s. See note 63, infra. However, 
as discussed infra, these inadequately compensate inventors or require the employee-inventor to make 
business decisions that the employer is in a better position to make.  
41 Bartow, supra note 9, at 690. 
42 Dratler, supra note 7, at 174-75 n.189. (“The monopoly power of a patent in the hands of a corporation 
may retard innovation in three ways. First, by refusing to license a dominant patent to holders of patents on 
improvements…a corporation can prevent the practice of innovation by others which might render its 
products less attractive or obsolete. Secondly, through patent-pooling and cross-licensing, one corporation 
or a small oligopoly can dominate an entire area of commerce or technology and prevent entry by 
innovative newcomers. Finally, economic reliance on the monopoly power may reduce the corporation’s 
incentive to better its own products.”).  
43 Id. at 147.  
44 See Parker, supra note 2, at 624. This is especially true if the invention is a radical breakthrough or if its 
importance is outside the corporation’s industry. See Bartow, supra note 10, at 691. 




ignored.”46  If the employer decides not to patent an employee-inventor’s invention, the 
employee has no recourse if he has signed his patent rights away.47   
On the other hand, there are very compelling reasons for keeping the currently 
working, albeit flawed, status quo of employee-inventor patent assignment rights.  
Professor Robert Merges lists four categorical factors that mitigate for not changing the 
status quo: “(1) strategic bargaining analysis, (2) team production theory, (3) principal-
agent theory, and (4) common sense analysis of the bargain struck between employer and 
employee.” 48   These arguments against changes to the current employee-inventor 
compensation system are also based on fairness and efficiency.  Strategic bargaining 
analysis argues against awarding an employee a property right that could be used to 
holdup an employer after investment in a patented product.49  Such a right could 
drastically increase transaction costs associated with new technology and create 
bottlenecks to market exploitation.50  Team production theory also argues that individual 
compensation for joint inventions may be hard to define for members of research and 
development groups.51  Another argument for keeping the status quo is principal-agent 
theory, which suggests that an employee-inventor will spend time on inventing to the 
detriment of more germane, but necessary, work.52  Finally, Professor Merges argues that 
analysis of the bargain struck between employer and employee is already market efficient 
because it takes into account, “…the high cost of failed inventions, the stability of 
employee salaries over time, and the firm’s need to recoup the costs of failed inventions 
via ownership of those that are successful.”53  Employee salaries, it could be argued, are 
market-adjusted proxies for the expected value of all employee inventions and thus 
employee-inventors are already fully compensated for the probability of inventing 
something of value.54   
Professor Merges’ factors clearly discern four different areas of interaction 
regarding the relationship of employer and employee-inventor.  The factors, however, 
should be used to define a solution to the undercompensation of the employee-inventor, 
not as reasons for the continued status quo.  Applied in this manner, the inadequacies of 
the solutions that have been previously proposed are reaffirmed because they do not 
address strategic bargaining analysis, team production theory, principal-agent theory, and 
                                                
46 Parker, supra note 2, at 624. 
47 Neal Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor: New Approaches to Old Problems (Part I), 56 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 648, 659 (1974).  
48 Merges, supra note 5, at 2. 
49 Id. at 13. This is similar to the anti-commons theory articulated by Heller. Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111HARV. L. REV. 3 621, 
645 (1998).  
50 See Merges, supra note 5, at 12. Merges goes on to argue that, “ employer ownership is more efficient for 
two transaction-related reasons: (1) it occurs at the commencement of employment and thus is far simpler 
than deals struck after an employee makes a specific invention, and (2) it eliminates the possibility of 
holdups by employee-inventors, thereby making it more attractive for a firm to invest in research and 
development by employees in the first place.”  
51 Id. at 12; see also Feldman, supra note 10, at 69. 
52 Merges, supra note 5, at 26. “Employees will maximize their own utility, rather than their employer’s, 
which is problematic when employees have multiple responsibilities.”  
53 Id. at 12.  
54 Id. at 16; see also Feldman, supra note 10, at 68-69. 
CHICAGO – KENT COLLEGE OF LAW 
11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 186 
194 
common sense bargain analysis.  At the same time, the benefits of a patent reversion 
become even more apparent when viewed through the scope of the Merges factors.55   
II. SOLUTIONS TO THE UNDERCOMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE-INVENTORS 
There have been many suggestions of how to stymie America’s loss of its 
technological advantage.56  These range from organic solutions among the employer and 
the employee-inventor to common law and statutory solutions.57  Other countries have 
also proposed and implemented different systems to address this problem.58  Subsection 
A discusses other current proposals, and Subsection B then proposes and discusses a 
reversion of patent rights to the original inventor.   
A. Current Proposals for Fairly Compensating Employee-Inventors 
Some employers have recognized the need to compensate inventive employees 
and have implemented reward systems to spur innovation and the creation of 
inventions.59  Compensation systems come in all different shapes and sizes from cash 
bonuses per patent to career advancement.60  Some companies may offer stock options 
for employee inventions.61  The façade these programs create, however, does not hide 
their overall impotence.  It has been pointed out that, “[e]xisting reward plans are 
discretionary, subject to the employer’s changes of policy, and have not improved the 
declining U.S. patent balance.”62  Any reward program does not address the underlying 
imbalance of power held by the employer and therefore is an illusory solution at best.  In 
addition, most employer-defined reward programs do not fairly compensate employee 
innovation, let alone cure the patent balance problem.63   
The other fallacy in employer-defined reward programs is that the decision to 
patent and the patent prosecution are controlled exclusively by the employer.64  An 
                                                
55 This is discussed further infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.  
56 See Merges, supra note 5, at 38; Bartow, supra note 9, at 715; Dratler, supra note 7, at 190; and the 
discussion of university and state solutions infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
57 Merges, supra note 5, at 38.  
58 See the discussion on foreign state solutions infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.  
59 Merges, supra note 5, at 38; see Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Admin. Of Justice of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1984) (remarks by Donald W. 
Banner, IPO, Inc.) (“[I]t is sound policy for companies to have awards programs for inventors and other 
creative employees. Many companies have had such programs in place for years….The employer is in the 
best position to judge the relative importance of the contributions made by the inventor.”).  
60 Merges, supra note 5, at 38  
61 Stock options are an indirect means to tie an employee-inventor’s work product to the company’s bottom 
line. In effect, stock options return some of the ownership interest in the patent back to the employee-
inventor by giving equity in the employer. This may appear to be a solution to the undercompensation of 
employee-inventors, but like other employer-defined rewards programs, without an impetus to the 
employer to fairly compensate the employee-inventor, stock option compensation is only theoretical.  
62 Parker, supra note 2, at 626.  
63 Merges, supra note 5, at 40-41. There are some employer defined innovation reward programs that do 
fully compensate employee inventors. “BMC Software… stated in its annual report that it had paid $4.9 
million in royalty compensation and that some individual programmers were earning more than $1 million 
per year because the products they developed were so profitable.” 




employer’s lack of business interest or insufficient intellectual property funding, “stifle 
commercial exploitation of inventions by blocking employee’s pursuit of further 
development or receipt of additional financial reward.”65  It is socially inefficient to put 
the control of patent prosecution in the hands of an entity whose agenda may not be 
aligned with the inventor.66   
In a more proactive call for change, Ann Bartow suggested that the employee-
inventors of the world should unite and create patent collectives.67  This idea is based on 
the age-old bargaining tactic of collective organization or unionization.68  Scientists and 
engineers are not apt to unionize though, because of a myriad of factors not applicable to 
other bargaining groups—such as aspirations of management.69  While unionization is 
not a realistic probability, a collective patterned after copyright collectives could give 
employee-inventors the bargaining power to more fairly allocate compensation for 
inventions by employees.70  In the absence of legislative or judicial action, this may be 
the best way to change the status quo.71  The grassroots nature of the idea, however, 
requires massive organization and cohesiveness among the members which may prevent 
a collective from ever becoming powerful enough to rebalance the bargaining positions 
of employer and employee-inventor.   
 Because no change has been initiated by the parties themselves, Jay Dratler Jr. 
posited that patent rights could be divided and reallocated between the employer and 
employee-inventor so as to better promote innovation.72  This would create a system of 
shared patent rights in both parties.  Bargaining between the employer and the employee, 
whether privately or through compulsory arbitration, would accurately compensate both 
players for minimal transaction costs.73  By presuming ownership of an invention by the 
                                                
65 Id.  
66 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 887 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1988). 
67 Bartow, supra note 9, at 715. Accord Dratler, supra note 7, at 157. 
68 IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 1 (1950) (“In a few years 
following the first inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, public policy with respect to collective 
bargaining crystallized. The right of employees to organize and bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing was underwritten by the federal government in Section 7(a) of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, in Public Resolution No. 44, in the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act, in the 
Guffey Act, and in the Wagner Act.”).  
69 Dratler, supra note 7, at 157-58 (“First, they consider unionization unnecessary and demeaning to their 
status as white collar employees and independent professionals. Second, many inventors aspire to 
management positions and have no desire to alienate their superiors. Third, even when inventors attempts 
to organize, conflicts with blue collar workers create difficulties in defining the appropriate bargaining unit, 
because those workers, represented by existing unions, often do similar or related work. Finally, when 
technical personnel do join existing unions, the patent rights issue is of concern only to a minority of union 
members, and so falls to the bottom of the agenda.”); Parker, supra note 2, at 609 (“Many [scientists and 
engineers] hope to become managers and do not want to risk alienating their superiors. Even when a union 
exists, the issue of inventor’s rights will in practice be dropped quickly due to strong employer 
resistance.”).  
70 Bartow, supra note 9, at 715-16 (“[C]opyright holders...become members of copyright collectives by 
granting them the non-exclusive right to license the public performance of their musical compositions; the 
collectives, in turn, license rights to radio and television stations, nightclubs, hotels and other venues.”).  
71 Cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
72 Dratler, supra note 7, at 190. 
73 Bartow, supra note 9, at 195-96.  
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employee-inventor, reallocation of patent rights could be seen as a compulsory license in 
the employee’s favor.  But because the employee-inventor needs the employer to exploit 
the invention, Dratler reasons that the parties will work with each other to maximize their 
profits.74  While this theory sounds plausible in an academic sense, whether such a 
system could work in practice seems doubtful because of the implementation and holdup 
problems that would arise.75   
 Many state universities have chosen to compensate their faculty- and research-
inventors for their pre-assignment patent rights.  The University of California system 
requires pre-assignment of all patent rights but also has a compulsory royalty sharing 
plan.76  If the University’s technology transfer office patents the invention, 35% of net 
royalties are automatically paid to the inventor.77  In addition, the University may release 
patent rights back to the inventor if the University decides not to pursue a patent or if 
equity calls for such a release.78  M.I.T., Texas A&M, and other major research university 
systems have similar royalty sharing provisions.79  Compulsory royalty sharing plans may 
appear to be fairer to the employee-inventor, but they suffer from some of the same 
problems as other employer-defined compensation systems: the employer totally controls 
the system and the employee-inventor has no recourse if left out in the cold.   
 Heeding a call from their electorates, both states and the federal government have 
also attempted to step in to protect employee-inventors.  Eight states have passed 
legislation limiting pre-assignment agreements as of 2001, but these restrictions are 
usually only aimed at protecting an employee-inventor’s invention made on his own time 
                                                
74 Id. at 197.  
75 See Heller, supra note 49, at 645; see also note 143, infra. The problem of holdup is maximized in a 
shared rights system. While holdup remains an issue in patent reversion, it is not as great of a concern 
because the patent rights are never shared, as discussed infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.  
76 U.C. Patent Policy, http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/pat-pol_97.html (last visited March 7, 2010).  
77 Id. at Statement of Policy, Subsection C (“Subject to restrictions arising from overriding obligations of 
the University pursuant to gifts, grants, contracts, or other agreements with outside organizations, the 
University agrees, following said assignment of inventions and patent rights, to pay annually to the named 
inventor(s), or to the inventor(s)' heirs, successors, or assigns, 35% of the net royalties and fees per 
invention received by the University. An additional 15% of net royalties and fees per invention shall be 
allocated for research-related purposes on the inventor's campus or Laboratory.”).  
78 Id. at Statement of Policy, Subsection B (“In the absence of overriding obligations to outside sponsors of 
research, the University may release patent rights to the inventor in those circumstances when: (1) the 
University elects not to file a patent application and the inventor is prepared to do so, or (2) the equity of 
the situation clearly indicates such release should be given, provided in either case that no further research 
or development to develop that invention will be conducted involving University support or facilities, and 
provided further that a shop right is granted to the University.”). While such a release could be 
implemented as a means to give employee-inventors greater control and interest in patenting their own 
inventions, such a release scheme does not address the major issue: employee-inventors are 
undercompensated by their employers for successful patent inventions.  
79 Guide to the Ownership, Distribution, and Commercial Development of M.I.T. Technology § 4.7(3), 
http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/community/guide4.html (last visited March 7, 2010) (“Distribute one-third of 
the Adjusted Royalty Income to the inventors/authors. This distribution shall be contingent upon the 
inventors/authors adherence to the obligations of any applicable sponsored research agreement.”); Texas 
A&M Intellectual Property Management and Commercialization 4.8.2 Step 2, 
http://www.tamus.edu/offices/policy/policies/pdf/17-01.pdf (last visited March 7, 2010) (“Distribute thirty-




without company resources.80  All state legislation, thus far, allows a pre-assignment of 
patent rights if a sufficient nexus exists between the invention and the employer’s 
research and development.81  Congress also has endeavored to create employee-inventor 
protections with proposed amendments to the patent law.82  Under one such proposal, 
employees who assigned their patent rights were entitled to the fair market value of those 
rights.83  If the parties could not come to an agreement on compensation, an arbitration 
board designated by the statute was to decide on the dispute.84  Ultimately this bill was 
not passed, and the employee-inventor status quo remained unchanged.85   
 Other industrialized countries have addressed the inequity of the employee-
inventor bargaining position as well.  Japan’s Article 35 of the patent law grants the right 
to “reasonable remuneration for employed-inventors when the employee transfers the 
property right of the patent…based on the profits of the employer and the proportionate 
                                                
80  Donald J. Ying, A Comparative Study of the Treatment of Employee Inventions, Pre-Invention 
Assignment Agreements, and Software Rights, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 763, 766-67 (2008). These 
states are California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Utah, and Washington. Some 
would argue that only inventions made by employees on their own time and unrelated to their employer’s 
business should remain the property of the employee-inventor. This overlooks the fact that usually 
scientists and engineers have educational backgrounds generally directed toward their employer’s 
businesses. It is not a large leap to assume that a large percentage of inventions will therefore be related to 
their employer’s businesses because inventors have technical training in that particular field.  
81 Parker, supra note 2, at 613. 
82 H.R. 3285, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3286, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983). This bill would have 
added §§ 221-223 to Title 35. Section 222 would have added, “(4) the term ‘employment invention’ means 
an invention that is made by an employee during a term of employment—(a) as a result of the employee’s 
normal or specifically assigned duties; or (b) based in significant part upon or suggested by technical date 
or information of the employer which is not generally known to the public; or (c) when the invention is 
related to the employer’s actual or contemplated business known to the employee; or (d) with substantial 
use of the employer’s time, materials, facilities, or funds” Section 223 would have imposed a limitation 
upon terms of an employee preinvention assignment agreement: “(a) A preinvention assignment agreement 
shall not be enforceable to transfer any rights to the employer in any invention that is not an employment 
invention….(c) A preinvention assignment agreement shall not be enforceable to transfer any rights to an 
employer in any invention that is conceived by an employee of the employer after termination of 
employment with the employer. (d) In case of any disagreement or conflict with respect to the rights or 
obligations created by any provision of this chapter, the matter shall be settled by arbitration in the State in 
which the employee is employed in accordance with the Patent Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association, at the request of either part.” See also H.R. 4932, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1973). This 
proposed bill would have modified 29 U.S.C. § 185-87 as follows: “It shall be unlawful for an employer to 
require as a condition of employment that any prospective employee of his or any of his employees agree to 
assign any patent or patentable invention to the employer or to maintain or enforce any agreement with any 
of his employees to assign any patent or patentable invention to the employer where such agreement was a 
condition of employment.”  
83 H.R. 3285, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); See Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Admin. Of Justice of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1984) (remarks by Donald 
W. Banner, IPO, Inc.) (“The remaining bills relating to regulation of inventors’ rights are H.R. 3285, which 
would create a comprehensive federal system for determining the amount of compensation to be paid to 
employees who make inventions, and H.R. 3286, which would set federal standards for contracts between 
employers and employees regarding ownership of inventions made by employees.”).  
84 H.R. 3286, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 
85 Id. The bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, who referred it to the Sub-committee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. No major action was taken.  
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contribution by the employee to the invention itself.”86  Germany grants an employee-
inventor, “a share of the value of the invention in addition to salary.”87  This share of the 
value is defined as if the employee-inventor, “held ownership rights and had entered into 
an arm’s length licensing agreement with the employer.”88  When put in practice, 
                                                
86 Japanese Patent Act, Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 35 (“(1) An employer, a juridical person or a national or 
local government (hereinafter referred to as "employer, etc."), where an employee, an officer of the 
juridical person, or a national or local government employee (hereinafter referred to as "employee, etc.") 
has obtained a patent for an invention which, by the nature of the said invention, falls within the scope of 
the business of the said employer, etc. and was achieved by an act(s) categorized as a present or past duty 
of the said employee, etc. performed for the employer, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "employee 
invention") or where a successor to the right to obtain a patent for the employee invention has obtained a 
patent therefore, shall have a non-exclusive license on the said patent right. (2) In the case of an invention 
by an employee, etc., any provision in any agreement, employment regulation or any other stipulation 
providing in advance that the right to obtain a patent or that the patent rights for any invention made by an 
employee, etc. shall vest in the employer, etc., or that an exclusive license for the said invention shall be 
granted to the employer, etc., shall be null and void unless the said invention is an employee invention. (3) 
Where the employee, etc., in accordance with any agreement, employment regulation or any other 
stipulation, vests the right to obtain a patent or the patent right for an employee invention in the employer, 
etc., or grants an exclusive license therefore to the employer, etc., the said employee, etc. shall have the 
right to receive reasonable value. (4) Where an agreement, employment regulation or any other stipulation 
provides for the value provided in the preceding paragraph, the payment of value in accordance with the 
said provision(s) shall not be considered unreasonable in light of circumstances where a negotiation 
between the employer, etc. and the employee, etc. had taken place in order to set standards for the 
determination of the said value, the set standards had been disclosed, the opinions of the employee, etc. on 
the calculation of the amount of the value had been received and any other relevant circumstances. (5) 
Where no provision setting forth the value as provided in the preceding paragraph exists, or where it is 
recognized under the preceding paragraph that the amount of the value to be paid in accordance with the 
relevant provision(s) is unreasonable, the amount of the value under paragraph (3) shall be determined by 
taking into consideration the amount of profit to be received by the employer, etc. from the invention, the 
employer, etc.'s burden, contribution, and treatment of the employee, etc. and any other circumstances 
relating to the invention.”) (unofficial translation); See also Healy, supra note 18, at 394; Ying, supra note 
80, at 773-75. 
87 Healy, supra note 18, at 388; Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen [German Law of Employee’s 
Inventions], July 25, 1957, Bgbl. I at 756 as last amended by Law December 22, 1997 (“Chapter 2, Section 
12Ascertaining or Fixing Compensation: (1) The nature and amount of compensation shall be established 
by agreement between the employer and the employee within a reasonable time after the claim to a service 
invention. (2) Where two or more employees have contributed to a service invention, compensation shall be 
determined separately for each of them. The employer must notify the employees of the total amount of 
compensation awarded and of the share assigned to each inventor. (3) Where no compensation agreement is 
concluded within a reasonable time after a claim to a service invention was made, the employer shall fix the 
amount of compensation, giving his reasons in writing to the employee, and shall pay in accordance with 
his settlement. For unlimited claims to a service invention, compensation must be fixed within three months 
from the grant of the industrial property protection; for limited claims, it must be fixed within three months 
from when the invention began to be used. (4) An employee who disagrees with the settlement may object 
thereto in writing within two months. If he does not object, the settlement shall be binding upon both 
parties. (5) Where two or more employees have contributed to the service invention, the settlement shall 
not bind any of them if one of them objects on the ground that his contribution to the service invention has 
been incorrectly determined. In this case, the employer may make a new compensation settlement for all 
parties. (6) Both the employer and the employee may require the other to consent to a different 
compensation arrangement, if a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances essential to 
ascertaining or fixing the compensation. A refund of compensation payments already received may not be 
requested. Subsections (1) to (5) shall not be applicable.”). 




however, there are many detractors to these government run compulsory licenses.89  The 
general language of the statutes and lack of specific definitions as to ‘reasonable 
remuneration’ leave many employee-inventors in limbo as to their rights in their 
inventions.90  The parties’ freedom to contract is also totally replaced with the heavy 
hand of government intervention.  In addition, arbitration boards introduce uncertainty 
into ownership of patent rights, which is something the patent law strives to discourage.   
Because employer-defined compensation leaves power exclusively in the hands of 
the employer, the employee-inventor’s problems and the derivative social loss created 
call for external intervention.  To preserve the free market structure, however, 
government intervention should be kept as minimally intrusive as possible.91  The 
tradeoff between these two elements proposed by current solutions leaves something to 
be desired and thus a different solution is advised. 
B. A New Solution: Patent Reversion 
 In response to the declining American patent balance, and to address the inequity 
in bargaining position held by the employee-inventor, a reversion of patent rights is 
proposed.  Other solutions presented above have too many drawbacks.92  Employer-
defined compensation systems leave control in the hands of employers who routinely 
undercompensate employee-inventors.  Compulsory licenses suffer from costly 
government intervention in the form of arbitration boards and uncertainty in the law.  
Additionally, none of these solutions specifically address the problem that employee-
inventors are routinely undercompensated by an amount proportionate to their successful 
technological innovations.  A delicate balance must be found in the form of regulation 
that more fairly compensates employee-inventors without being overbearing on 
employers.  This section first reviews the reversion in copyright and then proposes that a 
similar reversion should be implemented in patent law.   
i.  The Reversion in Copyright 
A reversion of ownership to the original author of a work has been in place in 
copyright law for over 220 years.93  The 1976 Copyright Act94 terminates transfers and 
licenses granted by the author for five years beginning thirty-five years after the date of 
                                                
89 Id. at 43-44.  
90 Id.  
91 See LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, MICROECONOMICS 31 (2004).  
92 See the discussion on previously proposed solutions, supra notes 55-90 and accompanying text. 
Professor Merges’ factors argue against the implementation of all previously proposed solutions as well, 
supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
93 Copyright Act of 1790. Originally, a copyright had a two-term renewal system in which the author could 
renew his exclusive use of a work. “Theoretically, the right of renewal gave the author or his statutory heirs 
a chance to renegotiate the terms of a license or transfer with the enhanced leverage of knowing the market 
valuation of the copyrighted work.” Adam R. Blankenheimer, Of Rights and Men: The Re-Alienability of 
Termination of Transfer Rights in Penguin v. Steinbeck, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 321, 325 (2009). 
Blankenheimer provides a great history of the copyright renewal and reversion system.  
94 1976 Copyright Act; It has evolved into 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2002). 
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execution of the grant.95  While this reversion is subject to conditions, “[t]ermination of 
the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.”96  The effect 
of such a termination is that, “[u]pon the effective date of termination, all rights…that 
were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author.”97  An author of a successful 
copyright may apply to have the assignment rights revert back to him so that he or his 
family may reap some of the rewards of the creation.98  While the author is not entitled to 
the lifetime profits of his creation, this reversion allows some compensation to the author 
while allowing the employer to recoup investment costs and make a profit as well.    The 
reversion in copyright takes effect thirty-five years after the original grant or, if the right 
of publication was included, the shorter of thirty-five years after the date of publication or 
forty years after the original grant.99   As copyrights created after January 1, 1978 subsist 
for the life of the author plus seventy years after the author’s death, a reversion after 
thirty-five years of a grant gives the original author a significant opportunity to exploit 
their creative work.100   
During the reversion, an author is free to renegotiate licenses on terms that more 
accurately reflect the market value of a copyrighted work.  The negotiation process for 
licensing the reverted rights may actually start before the reversion: “[t]he future rights 
that will revert upon termination of the grant become vested on the date the notice of 
termination has been served.”101  Coupled with the requirement that “notice shall be 
served not less than two or more than ten years before [the five year reversion period],”102 
a window to negotiate the reverted copyright is opened.  This allows the author to assign 
the copyright reversion interest before the reversion actually takes place.  The notice 
restriction also prevents an employer from requiring pre-assignment of copyrights as a 
condition to employment because the rights do not vest until notice is served.103   
                                                
95 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) states in pertinent part, “Termination of the grant may be effected at any time 
during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of the execution of the 
grant[.]” Id.  
96 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). Some of the conditions to reversion are laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4): “The 
termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing, signed by the number and proportion 
of owners of termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection.” Id. The House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary noted the active steps required by the original author to enable 
the reversion as opposed to automatic reversion of the previous provision. See Notes of Comm. on the 
Judiciary, H.R. 94-1476. 
97 17 U.S.C. § 203(b).  
98 See Blankenheimer, supra note 93, at 321. (“With the copyright back in hand and knowledge of its fair 
market worth, the author has a second opportunity to sell it for a price that better reflects the work’s 
value.”) 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).  
100 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(6) & 302(a).  
101 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2). 
102 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A). 
103 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). While there could be a Constitutional question over the inability of an author 
to transfer or assign a reversion, the Supreme Court has held that the reversion is an, “inalienable authorial 
right.” New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 438, 496 n.3 (2001); Accord Stewart v. Abend, 495 




The copyright reversion was created to give an author a second bite at the 
apple.104  It addresses the unequal bargaining position employers have in relation to 
employee-authors by statutorily trumping any pre-assignment contracts for a definite 
period of time.105  When a work is created, neither the author nor the employer can 
accurately predict the value of such a work over its lifetime.106  Because of these factors, 
authors routinely assign their copyrights for a fraction of their actual worth.107  The 
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary noted its reasoning for a reversion: 
A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of 
the authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s value 
until it has been exploited.  Section 203 reflects a practical compromise that will 
further the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and 
legitimate needs of all interests involved.108   
This underlies the problems of pre-assignment contracts: the employer has an 
overwhelmingly favorable bargaining position and the value of any creation is unknown 
until it is commercially exploited. 109   Congress believed that market forces were 
ineffective against these factors and implemented the hard paternalism of a copyright 
reversion in response.   
As could be expected, the copyright reversion was strongly resisted by entities 
that employ authors such as publishers, producers, and movie studios.110  They argued 
that since authors assumed none of the risk or financial burden required to exploit a 
copyrighted work, the profits should go to the publishers and producers who do.111  
Employers also argued that a statutorily defined reversion would interfere with the 
party’s freedom of contract.112  Despite these arguments, Congress chose to pass a 
reversion in copyright law because of the inequalities implicit on authors in the status 
quo.   
                                                
104 See Stephen W. Tropp, It Had to Be Murder or It Will Be Soon- 17 U.S.C. § 203 Termination of 
Transfers: A Call for Legislative Reform,51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 797, 799-800 (2004) (“The 
renewal term of copyright is the law’s second chance to the author and his family to profit from his mental 
labors.”); id. at 802-03 (“The goal of the reversion in this area was to protect that artist and to correct the 
problem, which, according to both the House and Senate reports, derived from both the artist’s unique 
unequal bargaining power, and the inability to accurately determine the value of a work at the time of 
assignment.”). The exact origin of the phrase ‘second bite at the apple’ or ‘second bite of the apple’ is 
unclear: As of March 2010, Westlaw has 3,839 state and federal cases that used the phrase.  
105 Id. at 806. (“Because most authors are in no position to insist on favorable conditions at the time they 
transfer their rights, and because the profit potential of a work is generally unknown at that time, the right 
to renegotiate their assignment is essential to author’s interests.”); see also Matthew R. Harris, Copyright, 
Computer Software, and Work Made For Hire, 89 MICH. L. REV. 661, 686 (1990).  
106 Tropp, supra note 103, at 799-800. (“Authors frequently assign their copyrights for sums which have no 
relation to the true monetary value of the work if it should be successful.”). 
107 See id.  
108 Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 94-1476, supra note 96. 
109 See Tropp, supra note 103, at 806 (“[B]ecause most authors are in no position to insist on favorable 
conditions at the time they transfer their rights, and because the profit potential of a work is generally 
unknown at that time, the right to renegotiate their assignment is essential to author’s interests.”).  
110 See id.  
111 See id.  
112 See id.  
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While the reversion in copyright is beneficial to authors, it is severely limited by 
its inapplicability to works made for hire.113  Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a 
work made for hire as “(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned.”114  Because a work made 
for hire is statutorily defined to be the property of the employer or commissioner of the 
work, a reversion does not apply.  Another problem that concerned the copyright 
community was reversion to authors of joint works.115  Copyright law defines a joint 
work as, “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or independent parts of a unitary whole.”116  
Basing joint authorship on the intention of the authors instead of something more definite 
opens the door to the possibility of subsequent abuse.  Similarly, financially successful 
works can create disharmony among authors of a joint work in terms of licensing 
decisions.  An accounting is due to all joint authors from any profits earned from 
exploiting a work.117  A joint author of a work has an individual right to exploit the work 
or grant a nonexclusive license,118 but an exclusive license requires the consent of all 
joint authors. 119   Because all authors must approve, an exclusive license may be 
extremely hard to bargain for with joint authors.120  Without the consent of all authors, a 
license cannot be exclusive and is thus not as valuable to a potential licensee.  All of 
these problems in copyright joint works have created a rich tapestry of common law 
which should be used as an example for defining a patent law reversion.121   
Employers were also very concerned with the assignment rights associated with 
derivative works.  A derivative work is, “based upon one or more preexisting works in 
any…form that may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”122  If ownership of a copyrighted 
material reverted back to the original author, publishers and producers were concerned 
that the author may be able to block use of these derivative works during the reversion.  
Congress addressed this issue by including in the statute the following: “[a] derivative 
work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be 
utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not 
extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the 
                                                
113 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).  
114 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
115 See Harris, supra note 104, at 689. In the case of a successful work, it was also feared that more parties 
would come out of the woodwork and contend they were joint authors, but such a charge seems better 
suited to joint authorship law than the copyright reversion.  
116 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005) (emphasis added).  
117 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1976); see also Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 94-1476, supra note 96. 
(“There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of the co-owners 
of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, co-
owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each co-owner having an 
independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other co-owners 
for any profits.”).  
118 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff’d by 490 U.S. 
730 (1989).  
119 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1976).  
120 See Harris, supra note 104, at 691. 
121 As discussed infra, notes 165-70 and accompanying text, the intention of the inventors is not a factor in 
defining joint works and thus many of these problems are not present in patent law.  




copyrighted work.”123  This allows employers to continue to exploit derivative works 
without infringing the reverted copyright.   
ii.  A Patent Reversion 
1.  Structure of a Joint Reversion 
Applying logic similar to that underlying the reversion in copyright law, the 
creation of a reversion of patent rights is proposed.124  In this system, the patent rights 
assigned to the original employer revert to the original inventor in joint ownership with 
the employer-assignee toward the end of the patent term.125  Such a reversion should 
increase American innovation and help rectify the current patent imbalance by giving 
back to inventors the incentive to create.   
Under the proposed reversion, an inventor would be given a statutorily defined 
right to have a patented invention revert to joint ownership for the last two years of patent 
exclusivity.126  The amount of time chosen for the reversion should be small enough to 
allow employers to make a return on their investment but long enough to allow 
employee-inventors a chance to financially appreciate the contribution their invention has 
made to society.127  The reversion should also occur at the end of the patent’s term.  This 
would allow both parties to know the value of the patent with precision by measuring 
sales of products that incorporate the invention, market share, and other financial data.  
                                                
123 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1). The notes of the House Committee on the Judiciary succinctly explained an 
example, “a film made from a play could continue to be licensed for performance after the motion picture 
contract had been terminated [by § 203] but any remake rights covered by the contract would be cut off.” 
Notes of Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 94-1476, supra note 96. 
124 While the similarities between inventors and authors are great, the differences between the two groups 
cannot be ignored. First, the originality requirement for copyrights and the nonobviousness requirement for 
patents are two separate standards. Patents build on one another, while copyrights usually do not (derivative 
works in copyrights and patents are discussed infra). Second, the inventions of a particular patent employed 
by a product are not as easily identifiable compared to copyrighted works. In other words, it may be very 
difficult to tell if a certain patent is used in a certain product without expensive and time consuming 
infringement analysis. With products that may use hundreds or thousands of patents, it may be near 
impossible to discern which patents could be infringed and which are not. The practical implications of 
these differences are discussed infra.  
125 To avoid the problem of distinguishing between an employee and an independent contractor, patent 
rights assigned to an assignee should revert to the original inventor regardless of the existence of an 
employment relationship between the parties.  
126 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002) grants the holder of a patent twenty years of exclusive use. As discussed 
infra, the two year term of patent reversion may be too long in the eyes of the employer who owns the 
patent rights as based on the economics of their business model. If true, a shorter time period of patent 
reversion, such as one year, may be more appropriate. Without economic data, however, a two year 
window of reversion is proposed.  
127 An argument could be made that a patent is least valuable at the end of its life and thus even a two year 
reversion at the end of patent exclusivity would undercompensate an inventor. First, a limited reversion is 
the smallest paternalistic intrusion of the government into parties’ freedom of contract compared to a 
compulsory license or arbitration boards. Second, even a two year reversion is more compensation than no 
reversion at all. Refer to the discussion on industry specific problems with defining the correct term for 
reversion from the employer’s point of view, infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. Third, a patent is 
usually most valuable to its owner. During the last part of the patent’s life, the research and development 
costs have usually been paid off and all royalty or production income based on the patent is pure profit.  
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Such a patent reversion would efficiently and effectively address the inequalities inherent 
in pre-assignment contracts currently in use by employers while trumping the ambiguities 
in common law assignment of patent rights.128  Such a patent reversion would also 
compensate an employee-inventor by an amount directly proportional to their successful 
technological innovations.   
The proposed patent reversion creates joint ownership of the patent in the original 
inventor and the employer.  35 U.S.C. § 262 states, “each of the joint owners of a patent 
may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, 
without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.”129  This right is 
granted separately to each co-inventor which “allows co-owners to freely license others 
to exploit the patent without consent of other co-owners.”130  While joint ownership of 
the reverted rights creates issues regarding licensing and infringement, it provides a 
solution to the undercompensation of employee-inventors without totally cutting out the 
employer as an exclusive reversion would.  In this sense, a joint ownership patent 
reversion requires both parties to work together to fully exploit the value of the patent 
during the reversion period.   
The employer has two concerns regarding the reversion: continued use of the 
patent by itself and use by third parties including the new joint owner.  Because it 
remains a joint owner of the patent, the employer may continue to exploit the technology 
without fear of being sued for infringement.  Therefore, there are no interruptions in 
production or manufacturing because ownership remains with the employer.  In regard to 
use of the patent by third parties, the employer has three options.  First, the employer can 
do nothing and allow the original inventor, who now is a joint owner, to license the 
patent.  Second, the employer can work together with the original inventor in licensing 
the patent technology to third parties.  Finally, the employer can buy the patent rights that 
reverted to the original inventor and continue to exclusively exploit the technology as it 
sees fit.  While it may appear unnatural for an employee to negotiate with his employer 
over patent rights, this is no different than an employee’s negotiation over salary or 
benefits.  Additionally, when combined with these other forms of compensation, an 
employer may be able to better determine an employee’s worth to the company based on 
the quality of inventive output.  Ultimately, this is a problem that the market for the 
patent will decide based on the value of the technology at the time.   
The potential situations in which joint ownership will pose a problem, however, 
are relatively small.  In actual application, if a patent is valuable to an employer at the 
                                                
128 As discussed above, the reversion in copyright law does not apply to works made for hire, which 
significantly restricts its application and usefulness. In order to address the inequalities in bargaining power 
between the employer and employee-inventor, the proposed patent reversion would apply to inventions 
created by employee-inventors within the scope of their employment. Therefore, while similar in theory to 
the reversion in copyright, the proposed patent reversion would be vastly different in its underlying 
rationale and in practice.  
129 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).  
130 Ethicon, supra note 166, at 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 
F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); Tavory v. NTP, Inc., 297 Fed.Appx. 976, 982-83 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]ny 
of the co-owners of the patents-in-suit may license the patents-in-suit without obtaining the approval of, or 




time of reversion—which is eighteen years after the filing of the patent application—it is 
because the employer has been exploiting the invention economically.  Therefore, if a 
patent is still valuable to the employer, the employer has a large incentive to buy out the 
rights in the patent of the original inventor after the reversion occurs.  This scenario is the 
anticipated conclusion of the majority of patent reversions.131 
Licensing of a jointly owned invention creates problems for the licensee, licensor, 
and the other joint owners of the patent. “Each individual [owner] may only assign the 
interest he or she holds; thus, assignment by one joint [owner] renders the assignee a 
partial assignee. A partial assignee likewise may only assign the interest it holds; thus, 
assignment by a partial assignee renders a subsequent assignee a partial assignee.”132  
Without a license offer from all joint inventors, a patent is not worth as much to a 
prospective licensee.133  On the other hand, if the co-inventors work together, or if one 
joint owner buys out the other, the monopoly remains intact that allows control of the 
technology by the joint owners for the remaining two years of the patent’s life.  This puts 
the joint inventors in an advantageous economic bargaining position for negotiating the 
terms of a license if they work together.  Therefore, there is an incentive for co-owners to 
band together and exclusively license their patent or for one joint owner to buy out the 
other.   
While joint ownership allows for separate economic exploitation through 
licensing, enforcement of the patent in the form of litigation requires all joint owners to 
join the suit.134  “Absent the voluntary joinder of all co-owners of a patent, a co-owner 
acting alone will lack standing [to sue for infringement].”135  This creates a problem only 
if the joint owners do not work together, which again creates an incentive for one joint 
owner to buy out the other or for them to work together.   
Similar to copyright law, a patent reversion would be available “notwithstanding 
any agreement to the contrary.”136  Therefore, a patent would revert to the original 
inventor in joint ownership with the employer and override pre-assignment of patent 
rights to the employer.  This would more fairly compensate an employee-inventor for his 
contribution by giving him a second bite at the apple.137  It would also minimize the 
financial burden placed on the employer by limiting the scope of the reversion.  By 
                                                
131 The economically logical outcome may not hold up for a variety of reasons including unreasonable or 
illogical demands made by the employer, greater economic feasibility of infringing the patent and fighting 
the patent rights, or alternate technology.  
132 MPEP § 301 IV.  
133 Joseph Yang, Patent and Technology Licensing, 995 PLI/Pat 75 2 (“A savvy third party will play the 
joint owners off against each other, to get the sweetest deal. Conversely, if one joint owner wants to sue 
(rather than license), any other joint owner can cut off the suit by refusing to join or by granting a 
license.”).  
134 Israel Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Where one co-owner 
possesses an undivided part of the entire patent, that joint owner must join all the other co-owners to 
establish standing.”) (internal citations omitted); see Joseph Yang, Patent and Technology Licensing, 995 
PLI/Pat 75 2 (2010) (“Further, the exploiting joint owner has no duty to share royalties with any other joint 
owner, Conversely, to enforce the patent, all the joint owners must join the suit.”).  
135 Israel Bio-Eng’g Project, 475 F.3d at 1264-65.  
136 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4). 
137 See Bartow, supra note 9, at 693.  
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reviving an incentive to employee-inventors to invent, society is reaffirming its 
dedication to the individual inventor’s role in technological progress.   
Before the reversion could occur, advance notice of intent to have a reversion 
would need to be served on the employer and the USPTO and upon serving the notice, 
the future reversion rights would vest with the employee-inventor.138  The timeframe for 
serving the notice should be enough to give the employer time to negotiate to retain the 
exclusive right to exploit the patent from the original inventor or make contingency plans.  
This could be accomplished in a notice period ranging from six to twelve months.139  This 
notice period, before the reversion took effect, would also allow the employee-inventor to 
negotiate licenses of the future vested rights.  Requiring notice gives both parties an 
opportunity before the reversion to decide what is in their best financial interests and 
pursue that end without a lapse in production.  It also would prevent employers from 
requiring pre-assignment of patent reversion rights as a condition of employment because 
those rights would not vest until notice was served.140   
In addition to creating a reversion interest in the patent for the employee-inventor, 
an incentive for the employer to buy out the interest of the employee-inventor could be 
created in the form of a tax break.  The Internal Revenue Service applies 26 U.S.C. § 
1235 to the transfer of a patent, which in pertinent part provides: 
A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of property consisting of all 
substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a 
part of all such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a 
capital asset held for more than 1 year.141 
This means that in the sale of a patent held for more than one year, the transferor’s 
income is taxed as capital gains and the transferee must amortize the cost over time.  In 
the case of a patent reversion, a change to the tax code could allow the transferee-
employer to elect to treat the cost of buying the reversion interest of the employee-
inventor as an ordinary business expense and deduct the entire amount from its taxable 
income for that year.  This in itself could be of great benefit to the employer as the cost of 
buying the employee-inventor’s reversionary interest in the patent could be offset by the 
tax treatment. 
2.  Benefits of a Reversion 
Employers would benefit from a patent reversion as well as employees.  In 
addition to the proposed tax benefits, better compensation for inventions will encourage 
more employees to become inventors.  In turn, this incentive will also encourage more of 
the top students to become the scientists and engineers of tomorrow.  More inventors 
mean increased invention quality and quantity—which translates to increased employer 
profits.  An increase in the number of patents filed may save research and development 
                                                
138 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2). 
139 Compare this to the notice required in copyright, discussed supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. 
140 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). 




expenses as more innovation will be available in the public domain.142  A reversion may 
also increase employee loyalty because derivative products may be easier to develop and 
exploit with one employer.143  If an employer makes more products based on an 
employee-inventor’s patent, the patent itself becomes more valuable when the time 
comes to negotiate a license during reversion.  Therefore, a patent reversion more closely 
aligns an employer’s profits to the future profits of the employee-inventor to whom the 
patent will revert.144  Such regulation is the best solution because the employer and 
employee-inventor relationship is not a zero-sum game: both parties benefit from a patent 
reversion.145   
A patent reversion also solves many of the problems associated with the 
inequalities present in the current employee-inventor context.  The four Merges 
categorical concerns for keeping the employee-inventor status quo—strategic bargaining 
analysis, team production theory, principal-agent theory, and common sense analysis—
operate favorably through the implementation of a patent reversion.146  While a patent 
reversion does give an employee-inventor a property right, that right is only asserted at 
the end of the term of exclusivity.  Because this property right is never shared between 
the two entities, the tragedy of the anti-commons theory of split ownership does not come 
into play.147  The employer has eighteen years from the date of filing to exclusively 
exploit the patent and make a profit before the employee-inventor’s second chance.  By 
partially transferring the patent rights associated with an invention back to the original 
inventors, an employer is free from creating a method to compensate individuals for their 
contribution to an invention: an inventor’s compensation is based on their own ability to 
license the patent during the reversion.148   
The fear of employee-inventors reallocating their time toward personal invention 
is partially mitigated by the fact that both the employer and the employee benefit by 
increased sales of current products based on the employee-inventor’s patent.  Thus, an 
employee-inventor has a vested interest in ensuring his employer’s bottom line remains 
                                                
142 The savings in research and development money may be partially offset by increased licensing costs.  
143 An employee who patents an invention may want to stay with the same employer in order to maximize 
the commercial exploitation of the original idea and its derivatives so that when the patent rights revert 
back to the employee he has a larger portfolio of products to negotiate over.  
144 This is the same effect the grant of stock options has on an employee as discussed supra note 14. 
145 One party does not have to lose for the other to win: they can both win with a patent reversion. The 
employer benefits from the increased quality and quantity of inventions under their control which boosts 
their profits. The employee-inventor benefits from the increased compensation for successful inventions.  
146 Merges, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
147 See Heller, supra note 49, at 645. An anti-commons occurs when rights, such as property rights, are split 
among a group of people with different interests. If any one of the rights holders wants to act, it requires the 
unanimous agreement of the group. In practice, such agreement almost never occurs and thus the common 
property is left undeveloped and never used. An example of this is what occurred in post-communist 
Russia. The government, in an attempt to fairly disperse what had been communal property, issued joint 
property rights in buildings and shops to individuals. Because the property rights holders could not come to 
an agreement on the use of the shops, the shops remained empty while street vendors lined the streets just 
outside. See id.  
148 The scope of inventorship, most commonly seen as disputes in joint authorship in copyright, is not as 
large of a concern in patent law and is discussed infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.  
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strong now and into the future.149  Lastly, the high cost of bringing a successful product 
to market, including research and development of failed inventions, will always be 
present in technologically advanced fields.  A patent reversion, however, only impacts an 
employer’s last two years of exclusivity, long after costs should have been recouped and 
a tidy profit made.150  In addition, a patent reversion leaves the door open for the 
employer to bargain for an exclusive license of the employee-inventor rights and continue 
making money during this time.   
3.  Practical Considerations 
The practical arguments against a patent reversion require examination as well.  
While many have been brought up in the copyright domain, these detractions are just as 
apropos when applied to a patent reversion.  First, a patent reversion could be seen as 
paternal interference with the parties’ freedom to contract.151  The majority of employee-
inventors, however, are required to sign pre-assignment agreements as prerequisites to 
employment.152  Thus, the relationship between the parties does not truly allow both 
parties to freely negotiate their contract terms in the first place.  While close scrutiny 
should be given to such a hard paternalistic intervention by the government, the unequal 
bargaining power of the employee-inventor and the adhesion-like pre-assignment 
contracts indicate a failure of the employment market, and public policy calls for some 
regulation or intervention.153  By limiting the scope of the reversion, the inequality in the 
bargaining power of the employee-inventor is reduced while not over-empowering him at 
the same time: both of the parties are on more equal footing from the beginning of their 
relationship.  Compared to other suggested systems to correct this imbalance, a patent 
reversion would be relatively more efficient and easier to implement as well.154   
Second, the cost of doing business in high-tech areas could increase due to 
licensing costs of reverted patents or, in extreme cases, a type of holdup by the employee-
inventor.  Businesses whose income depends on patented technology may find 
themselves unable to retain exclusive use of what used to be their own patents.  Friction 
                                                
149 This is comparable to the effect that stock options would have on an employee-inventor. With a patent 
reversion, as opposed to stock options, however, the control of the compensation system is taken out of the 
hands of the employer.  
150 The timeframe on an employer’s return on investment may be industry specific and is discussed infra 
notes 173-78 and accompanying text.  
151 Such a statutorily mandated interference with the freedom to contract could be a huge detriment to the 
parties’ ability to negotiate the labor market for research and development. Compared to the compulsory 
licensing arrangements of Japan and Germany, supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text, a patent 
reversion is much less paternalistic and allows the parties to negotiate adequate compensation for 
inventions.  
152 Parker, supra note 2, at 608. This is also based on personal experience and discussions with other 
scientists and engineers while working in the technology industry.  
153 Dratler, supra note 7, at 145. In comparison to other forms of government intervention, a one-and-done 
regulation such as a patent reversion would be minimally invasive and would require relatively little 
continuing intrusion or oversight.  
154 Cf. Japanese Patent Law, supra note 86; German Patent Law, supra note 87. A patent reversion is 
designed to address the heart of the problem: inequality in the bargaining position of the employee-
inventor. By directly dealing with the underlying inequality, a patent reversion is a cures the disease and 




or secrecy between an employee-inventor negotiating with an employer may lead to 
inefficient production and loss of profits.155  In the worst case scenario, the employee-
inventor could license the patent to a competitor of his employer at a reduced cost.  But 
this parade of horrors overlooks the symbiotic relationship between employer and 
employee-inventor.  “The employer may have several natural advantages over 
competitors in bargaining for an exclusive license,” such as familiarity with the invention 
and its worth.156  Realistically, the employer and employee-inventor have a codependent 
economic incentive to work together in the exploitation of a product.157  The value of the 
patent in the reversion period is tied to the employer’s profits both before and after the 
reversion: the more money the employer makes the more money the employee-inventor 
will make during the reversion by licensing his patent.158   
The largest practical problem with a patent reversion is a type of employee holdup 
in relicensing the patent.159  While an employer would retain joint rights to the patent 
during the reversion period, an inventor could hold up the employer from retaining 
exclusive rights to exploit the patent by licensing the technology to a competitor.  If an 
employee does not act rationally in bargaining for licenses of his reverted patent, the 
employer could lose out on the investment it had made in production of the invention.  
The cost of relicensing the patent during the reversion may be overstated, however, 
because the employer would probably be in the best financial position to offer the largest 
                                                
155 See Parker, supra note 2, at 628; Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 110-11 (2006); H.R. 3286, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) Exhibit C(3) (“If the 
invention is related to the employer’s business known to the employee, it is essential that the employment 
agreement be permitted to cover it irrespective of whether the employee enjoys a special position of trust, 
etc. In many corporations the research scientists and development engineers will be familiar with aspects of 
the employer’s business on which they may not be working any given time but as to which they may make 
an invention because of their knowledge of the internal corporate efforts. To prevent the employer from 
acquiring such inventions would force the corporations to limit the in-house flow of information to the 
obvious detriment of the overall industrial system. The employer who is paying for the full time effort and 
loyalty of its employees should be entitled to assignment of their business related inventions, otherwise 
there could be serious conflicts of interest between the employees and employer.”).  
156 Dratler, supra note 7, at 197 (“The employer is familiar with the inventor, the process of development, 
and the field of technology to which the invention relates, so it can better estimate the impact of the 
innovation and its economic worth and more efficiently develop it. Furthermore, the invention may relate to 
products in a market dominated by the employer, so the employer may be able to profit more from it than 
competitors and thus offer the inventor better terms. Indeed, technology is so specialized today that a 
particular employer may be the only firm which can in practice make use of an invention.”).  
157 See Parker, supra note 2, at 628. 
158 While this article assumes that the employee-inventor still works for the original employer, the same 
logic and rationale behind the reversion applies if the employee-inventor changes employers or if the 
employer sells its rights to the patent before the reversion. The employee-inventor will have an incentive to 
license the patent during the reversion to the owner of the patent at the time immediately before the 
reversion begins.  
159 See Merges, supra note 5, at 12 (“Holdups are common in the intellectual property context because 
discrete intellectual property rights often cover individual components of a complex, multicomponent 
product….Many employee inventions fit this pattern: they are one component of a complex, 
multicomponent product whose total market value often exceeds the value of the component standing 
alone. As a result, the associated patents could serve as the basis of a holdup strategy if the patents were 
owned by individual employees….[T]he ex ante consequence might be underinvestment in R&D.”). 
Strategic bargaining analysis, of which holdup is a subcategory, was touched upon supra notes 141-43 and 
accompanying text. 
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licensing fee to the employee-inventor. 160   With manufacturing infrastructure and 
resources already in place and the value of the patent clearly defined from eighteen years 
of sales, the original employer-assignee could set the market for the patent.  At the same 
time, because the employer retains joint ownership rights in the patent, the employer will 
not offer to license the patent from the employee for an amount that will cause it to lose 
money during the reversion, so both the employer and employee-inventor should benefit.  
While a holdup is theoretically possible, it is not economically practical for either party 
and therefore is improbable.161   
Employers have also argued that an employee-inventor risks none of his own 
money, pays none of the prosecution fees, and shares none of the losses associated with 
an employer’s unsuccessful inventions.162  But for the employer’s resources, an employer 
may argue, the employee would never have invented.163  “Recognizing the valuable 
resources that employers invest in an inventive employee’s creative talent, it is still an 
employee’s genius that coalesces concepts into inventions.”164  This one-sided viewpoint, 
however, overlooks the risks taken by the employee-inventors.165  Novel inventions are 
not made by an assembly line, and inventors usually spend a considerable amount of 
personal time and resources conceiving of and developing their ideas. 166   These 
hypothetical fears may also be assuaged through the dual temporal limits on the proposed 
patent reversion: a patent would revert back to the original inventor only for two years 
and only after eighteen years at the end of patent exclusivity.167   
Third, the reallocation of patent rights could create a massive drain of 
administrative and judicial resources.  While notice papers would have to be filed and 
records kept of all inventors and assignees of patents, similar functions are already 
performed by the USPTO.168  Another employee or someone else could also claim that 
                                                
160 Accord Dratler, supra note 7, at 187. 
161 Theoretically, a holdup could occur in situations of employee-inventor spite or economically illogical 
behavior, but for the purposes of this article, it is assumed that the employee-inventor behaves as a rational 
actor in the relicensing of his reverted patent. Additionally, because holdup is a concern, the patent 
reversion is limited temporally in two ways: (1) it is only two years, which represents only 10% of the total 
patent’s life, and (2) it only comes into effect at the end of the patent term, which is eighteen years after 
filing.  
162 Parker, supra note 2, at 626. 
163 Marc B. Hershovitz, Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Rights of Inventive Employees and Their 
Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 191 (1995); H.R. 3286, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) Exhibit C (4) 
(“If the employee makes substantial use of the employer’s time, materials, facilities of [sic, or] funds, the 
employer should be entitled to the resulting invention. In this circumstance the employer has made 
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164 Hershovitz at 190. 
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they participated in the conception of a successful invention.169  Unlike copyright law, 
however, who is and who is not an inventor is more clearly defined both statutorily and in 
case law.170  False claims of joint invention post-application may increase, but would not 
pose as large a problem.171  The inventor of a patent is required to sign an oath stating 
that he is the correct inventor, and his name is then put on the patent application and later 
the patent.172  The Federal Circuit defined what is required to be listed as a joint inventor:  
he or she [must] (1) contribute in some significant manner to the conception or 
reduction to practice of the invention, (2) make a contribution to the claimed 
invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured 
against the dimension of the full invention, and (3) do more than merely explain 
to the real inventors well known concepts and/or the current state of the art.173   
If the inventorship of an invention is contested, The Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 1412.04 states that reissue is the vehicle for such a correction.174  
If reissue is unavailable, a court may add an omitted co-inventor to an issued patent.175   
One problem that could arise is the employer changing who is listed as an 
inventor after the patent has issued and been assigned.  Interestingly, “the [employer]-
assignee of the entire interest [in a patent] can file a reissue to change the inventorship to 
one which the [employer]-assignee believes to be correct, even though an [employee]-
inventor might disagree.”176  This could allow some chicanery by employers, but MPEP 
§ 1412.04 goes on to state that if an inventor has an ownership right in the patent, the 
inventorship may not be changed without the inventor’s consent.177  Presumably, a patent 
reversion would qualify as such a property right.  This language would seem to protect 
the inventor from post-assignment loss of rights.   
                                                                                                                                            
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) requires all assignments to be made in writing and recorded with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office within three months from the purchase.  
169 Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is an 
equally strong temptation for persons who consulted with the inventor and provided him with materials and 
advice, to reconstruct, so as to further their own position, the extent of their contribution to the conception 
of the invention.”).  
170 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101; 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2002).  
171 35 U.S.C. § 116 states, “When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for 
patent jointly and each make the required oath[.]” 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2002). Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461 (“To 
show inventorship…the alleged co-inventor or co-inventors must prove their contribution to the conception 
of the claims by clear and convincing evidence.”).  
172 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1998) (“The applicant shall make oath that he believes himself to be the original and 
first inventor of the [invention] for which he solicits a patent.”). 37 CFR § 1.63(a)(4) (2007) further 
requires that the inventor’s oath must, “ state that the person making the oath or declaration believes the 
named inventor or inventors to be the original and first inventor or inventors of the subject matter which is 
claimed and for which a patent is sought.” See MPEP § 602 (2007) for more details on the oath.  
173 Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
174 MPEP § 1412.04 II (2007). Reissue is an administrative process involving the USPTO in which a patent 
is issued again with substantive changes to the invention. The MPEP, while not mandatory authority, is 
very persuasive as the administrative guidelines used by the USPTO in patent prosecution and examination.  
175 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2002).  
176 MPEP § 1412.04 II (emphasis added), supra note 169. 
177 Id. (referencing 37 CFR § 1.172(a) (2000)).  
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The next factor that would have to be considered is that business profitability 
timelines are nonlinear and extremely industry specific.  A two year patent reversion 
assumes that an employer can recoup research and development costs and make a profit 
within the first eighteen years of patent exclusivity.  But the recovery of these costs is not 
spread evenly over the exclusivity period.  In some industries, only in the last few years 
do companies break even.  For example, the pharmaceutical industry spends about $800 
million in development and marketing costs on each successful drug.178  However, the 
first several years after patenting, a drug may actually lose money for a company as it 
looks to gear up for manufacturing, secure capital loans, and begin marketing 
campaigns.179  Placing the reversion period at the wrong point in time could totally 
eliminate the profitability in creating new drugs which would stymie medical research 
and have a cooling effect on the entire health industry.  The solution may be to carve out 
specific exceptions to the patent reversion for pharmaceuticals or other industries that can 
show a need for longer patent exclusivity based on economic analysis.180  On the other 
hand, a patent reversion may force industries to become more efficient and lean in their 
pre-production stages of development as they would have an increased incentive to 
exploit technology early and often in the face of a reduced exclusive patent ownership 
period.  In either case, more research may be needed before a one-size-fits-all reversion is 
put into place.181   
Similarly, in many industries such as software, a large percentage of patents may 
not be very valuable after eighteen years.  In many or most cases, it may not be worth the 
employee-inventor’s time and money to secure the reversion rights.  Because the value of 
the patent is not known until it has been exploited in the marketplace, only those 
inventions that are significantly lucrative would be subject to an employee exercise of his 
or her reversion right in practice.  But, when an invention is worth enough money, and 
thus it is more just to compensate the original employee-inventor, the reversion will be 
exercised.  This makes the proposed patent reversion more employer friendly because 
only successful patents will need to be relicensed.   
The ownership of derivative inventions, those inventions that are based on 
improvements to an underlying patent, could also be an area of concern for employers.182  
While it is clear that the patent itself would revert to joint ownership by the employer and 
employee-inventor, the employer has presumably made products based on the invention 
and created a market for them.  Often, a patented invention leads to further inventions 
which build on each other.183  Difficulties may arise in determining which products use 
the reverted patent and this could lead to increased amounts of infringement litigation 
during the reversion.  While the employer would retain joint ownership of the reverted 
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182 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.  
183 This can be seen from the many continuation, continuation-in-part, and other derivative patent 




patent, whether a particular product uses the patented technology and, thus, the value of 
the reverted patent, could become issues.  Again, the symbiotic nature between the parties 
must be taken into account.  The entity with the largest incentive to offer the highest 
license fee to the employee-inventor is probably his employer because the employer 
already has the infrastructure and resources in place to manufacture products based on the 
patented invention.  Further, both parties should have intimate knowledge of products 
which incorporate the invention and their respective commercial success.  An employee 
would have an incentive to license his reverted patent for enough money so that the 
employer still makes a profit and production is as high as possible.  As a last resort, the 
patent litigation field is well established and infringement proceedings can be brought to 
award adequate compensation or a reasonable royalty.184 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed creating a patent reversion in which the last two years of 
patent exclusivity revert back to the original inventor, in joint ownership with the 
employer, thus giving him a second bite at the apple.  The employee-inventor status quo 
is based on pre-assignment contracts involving inequality in bargaining power and 
unknown value of patented inventions.  Additionally, an employer’s business model may 
be adverse to new innovations that disrupt markets already in place.  However, the 
reversion is designed so as to minimally affect the employer’s ability to recoup costs and 
turn a profit.  A patent reversion efficiently and effectively addresses all of these issues 
by giving the employee-inventor a chance to reap the rewards of his innovation.   
While there are practical problems that will need to be addressed, the 
implementation of a patent reversion to the original employee-inventor would be 
beneficial to both parties along with the technological community as a whole.  Not only 
would employee-inventors have an incentive to innovate, thereby increasing society’s 
overall technical knowledge base, but more employees will want to invent knowing their 
inventions will be financially beneficial to them.  In addition, more students may be 
inclined to become scientists and engineers thereby improving the quality of the available 
workforce in the future.  Because of this, the number of American patented inventions 
should go up which is a boon to the economy as a whole.  Employee-inventors would 
also have a personal interest in seeing the employer’s sales and profits maximized 
thereby increasing the value of the underlying patent.  Smarter scientists and engineers 
working harder to maximize business profits would be very beneficial for employers even 
if the tradeoff is a loss of patent exclusivity at the end of a patent’s life.  Finally, a tax 
incentive should be created along with the reversion for employers that buy back the 
reversion interest of their employee-inventors.  This incentive would allow an employer 
to treat the cost of buying back the reversion as an ordinary business expense and deduct 
the entire amount from its taxable income.  The benefits of a patent reversion to 
employee-inventors, employers, and society in general are important enough to warrant 
implementation.  The status quo must be changed for employee-inventor rights in their 
inventions, and this can be accomplished by a patent reversion.  
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